Distribuição prioritária em um hospital de cuidados intensivos na Argentina. Estudo qualitativo de um caso by Gordon, Heather et al.
184
Acta Bioethica  2009; 15 (2): 184-192
PRIORITY SETTING IN AN ACUTE CARE HOSPITAL IN 
ARGENTINA: A QUALITATIVE CASE STUDY
Heather Gordon*, Lydia Kapiriri**, Douglas K. Martin***
Abstract: Purpose: To describe and evaluate priority setting in an Acute Care hospital in Argentina, using Accountability for Reasonableness, 
an ethical framework for fair priority setting. 
Methods: Case Study involving key informant interviews and document review. Thirty  respondents were identified using a snowball sampling 
strategy. A modified thematic approach was used in analyzing the data. 
Results: Priorities are primarily determined at the Department of Health.  The committee which is supposed to set priorities within the hospital 
was thought not to have much influence. Decisions were based on government policies and objectives, personal relationships, economic, 
political, historical and arbitrary reasons. Decisions at the DOH were publicized through internet; however, apart from the tenders and 
a general budget, details of hospital decisions were not publicized. CATA provided an accessible but ineffective forum for appeals. There 
were no clear mechanisms for appeals and leadership to ensure adherence to a fair process.
Conclusions: In spite of their efforts to ensure fairness, Priority setting in the study hospital did not meet all the four conditions of a fair process. 
Policy discussions on improving legitimacy and fairness provided an opportunity for improving fairness in the hospital and Accountability 
for Reasonableness might be a useful framework for analysis and for identifying and improving strategies. 
Key words: priority setting, Argentina, hospital, fairness, accountability for reasonableness
DISTRIBUCIÓN PRIORITARIA EN UN HOSPITAL DE CUIDADOS INTENSIVOS EN 
ARGENTINA. ESTUDIO  CUALITATIVO DE UN CASO
Resumen: Propósito: Describir y evaluar el establecimiento de prioridades en un hospital de cuidados intensivos en Argentina, empleando 
la Administración Razonable como marco ético para una justa asignación.
Métodos: Estudio de un Caso que incluía entrevistas  a un informante y revisión de documentos. Se identificó a treinta participantes empleando 
la estrategia de muestras tipo “bola de nieve”. Al analizar los datos, se empleó un enfoque temático modificado.
Resultados: Las prioridades se determinan principalmente en el Departamento de Salud. El comité que, se supone, debe establecer las 
prioridades dentro del hospital no tiene mayor influencia. Las decisiones se basan en políticas y objetivos gubernamentales, relaciones 
personales, razones económicas, políticas, históricas e, incluso, arbitrarias. Las decisiones del Departamento de Salud se publicitan a través 
de Internet; sin embargo, fuera de las propuestas y del presupuesto general, no se publicitan las decisiones del hospital. CATA proporciona 
un foro accesible pero ineficaz para apelar. No existen mecanismos claros para apelar ni para un liderazgo que asegure un proceso justo.
Conclusiones: A pesar de los esfuerzos por asegurar la equidad, el establecimiento de prioridades del hospital no cumple las cuatro condiciones 
de un proceso justo. Las discusiones acerca de políticas de mejoramiento, legitimidad y equidad dan oportunidad para mejorar la equidad 
en el hospital, y el marco ético “Administración Razonable” podría constituir un marco útil para el análisis así como para identificar y 
mejorar las estrategias.
Palabras clave: establecimiento de prioridades, Argentina, hospital, equidad, Administración Razonable
DISTRIBUIÇÃO PRIORITÁRIA EM UM HOSPITAL DE CUIDADOS INTENSIVOS NA 
ARGENTINA. ESTUDO QUALITATIVO DE UM CASO
Resumo: Propósito: Descrever e avaliar o estabelecimento de prioridades em um hospital de cuidados intensivos na Argentina, empregando 
a Administração Razoável como marco ético para uma justa destinação de recursos. 
Métodos: Estudo de um caso que incluía entrevistas a um informante e revisão de documentos. Foram identificados trinta participantes 
empregando a estratégia de amostras tipo bola de neve. Ao analisar os dados, se empregou um enfoque temático modificado.
Resultados: As prioridades são determinadas principalmente no Departamento de Saúde. O comitê que, se supõe, deve estabelecer as 
prioridades dentro do hospital não tem maior influência. As decisões se baseiam em políticas e objetivos governamentais, relações pessoais, 
razões econômicas, políticas, históricas e, inclusive, arbitrárias. As decisões do Departamento de Saúde são divulgadas por meio da Internet; 
no entanto, além das propostas e do orçamento geral, não se divulgam as decisões do hospital. CATA proporciona uma instância acessível, 
porém ineficaz para apelar. Não existem mecanismos claros para apelar nem para uma liderança que assegure um processo justo.
Conclusões: Apesar dos esforços para assegurar a equidade, o estabelecimento de prioridades do hospital não cumpre as quatro condições 
de um processo justo. As discussões sobre políticas de melhoria, legitimidade e equidade dão oportunidade para melhorar a equidade no 
hospital e no marco ético “Administração Razoável” poderia constituir um marco útil para a análise assim como para identificar e melhorar 
as estratégias.
Palavras-chave: estabelecimento de prioridades, Argentina, hospital, equidade, Administração Razoável.
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1. Introduction 
Priority setting in Latin America has become one 
of the most discussed issues within the government 
and among public administration scholars, especially 
because of the sweeping health system reforms across 
the region(1).  The economic crisis experienced by Ar-
gentina in December 2001 transformed a nation once 
regarded as an economic success guided by democratic 
stability into a state marred by financial collapse, cor-
ruption and descent into the deepest depression in its 
history.  Public administration has been profoundly 
influenced by this rupture in the nation’s economic, 
political and social fabric. Consequently, policy mak-
ing has become  too personalistic, too political and too 
unregulated(2-5). 
To address these challenges within the health sector 
the newest wave of scholarly work in priority setting 
in Argentina stresses the necessity of evidence-based 
decision as seen in the national conference proceed-
ings on health economics and national health policy 
in 2003(6). This emphasis has changed significantly 
since the 2000 health and economics conference, 
which focused on health outcomes and equity(7). More 
recently, academics and policy makers are demanding 
an investment in better evidence-gathering and infor-
mation systems, stressing the significance of evaluating 
the cost-effectiveness of health interventions(8-11). In 
addition, there has been a discussion of the necessary 
administrative and management technologies required 
to guide complex decision making essential in today’s 
urban hospitals(4,12). 
Argentina’s policy making evolution is following the 
same path other Northern nations did in the 1990s, 
when policy makers adopted an approach that focused 
on tools and evidence. This approach was thought to be 
insufficient to guide priority setting decisions because it 
only emphasized a narrow range of values (i.e. benefit 
and efficiency) and not the full range of values that are 
relevant to priority setting decisions(13). Regarding 
such technical approaches, Holm (2000) decided it 
was time to say “Goodbye to the simple solutions”(14). 
Priority setting is a value-laden process which lacks an 
overarching moral theory, and a technical approach 
cannot resolve the conflicts between competing rel-
evant values. Consequently, there has been an increased 
interest in fair procedures that would allow the full 
range of values to be considered in an inclusive, trans-
parent and responsive approach(1,15).
While the demand for the democratization of decision-
making is not new in the region, the acute national 
inequities experienced as a result of the economic crisis, 
in addition to international pressures, has increased the 
interest in establishing fair priority setting processes. 
The vast majority of literature on priority setting in 
post-crisis Argentina focuses on new management 
strategies, new health policy agendas and emphasizes 
consensus-seeking, fair processes and the guiding role 
of evidence(1,3,6).  Since 2001, community health 
centers, particularly those in the lower income neigh-
borhoods in Buenos Aires, have gradually introduced 
participatory budgeting processes. However, hospital 
budgeting processes have not followed their example. 
Moreover, there aren’t any studies describing and evalu-
ating priority setting in Argentina’s hospitals. 
This paper describes priority setting in an acute care 
municipal level public hospital in Buenos Aires, exam-
ines how closely current practice at a leading public 
hospital reflects the academic and policy discourse and 
evaluates the priority setting process using an ethical 
framework for fair processes.
2. Methods
Design: This research used qualitative case study 
methods, the appropriate method considering the 
complexity of Argentina’s context and the fluid na-
ture of the social interactions that are fundamental to 
priority setting.
Setting: We studied Fernandez Hospital, an acute care 
tertiary level hospital with 350 beds, a staff of 1700 and 
1200 daily consultations.  It is one of 33 public hospi-
tals directed by the Secretaría de Salud, or Department 
of Health (DoH) of the Capital District of Buenos 
Aires.  This Hospital was purposely selected for its 
comparability to similar case studies being conducted 
in other low and middle income countries(16).
Sampling: Theoretical and snowball sampling tech-
niques were employed. Initial respondents were 
recommended by the hospital management as having 
a key role in priority setting, and these participants 
identified subsequent respondents. Additional respon-
dents were selected, with the purpose of achieving a 
variety of views from different departments.  Since the 
budget for the hospitals was reviewed and approved 
by the Department of Health, respondents were also 
interviewed at ministry level. In total, 30 interviews 
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were conducted. Nine doctors, each from a differ-
ent department, 3 nurses, 3 medical directors and 3 
financial administrators, 2 academics, 4 ministerial 
staff, including 2 deputy ministers of health of Buenos 
Aires, 4 members of international non-governmental 
organizations, and 1 politician. 
Data Collection: three sources provided the data set: 
relevant documents, field observation and interviews. 
(i)  Documents such as hospital and ministry budgets 
were reviewed. These were identified by hospital man-
agement and ministerial staff.  Access to documents 
was necessary if they became relevant for the emerging 
themes and helped to validate the interview data. (ii) 
Observations of hospital, ministry and public settings 
were incorporated into the analysis when relevant. 
Observation of meetings within the hospital were 
not allowed. Extensive field notes were taken by the 
primary investigator (HG). (iii) Interviews were semi-
structured using open-ended questions, and themes 
were pursued as they emerged.  The interviews were 
guided by a questionnaire grounded in the conceptual 
framework- Accountability for Reasonableness, which 
has been used in many other North American and 
international contexts(16-21). Most of the interviews 
were conducted with both the principal investigator 
and a trained research assistant, in order to facilitate 
interviewing in Spanish. Interviews were audio-
recorded with the respondents’ permission.  Only one 
respondent refused to be recorded. 
Data Analysis: Audio-recorded interviews were tran-
scribed in Spanish.  All data were read and coded for 
recurring concepts. Similar concepts were grouped 
together under thematic categories. Categories were 
constantly compared and organized into over-arching 
themes.
Conceptual Framework: ‘Accountability for Reasonable-
ness’ was used as a framework for analysis(22). This is 
an ethical framework for legitimate and fair priority 
setting with four conditions: decisions are based on 
explicit rationales that stakeholders consider relevant 
to the context; decisions and reasons are publicly ac-
cessible and decision making is transparent; there are 
explicit revision mechanisms and active leadership to 
ensure that the first three conditions are met. 
Research Ethics: The research was approved by the 
University of Toronto Research Ethics Board and by 
the hospital’s ethics board. All participants provided 
written consent before the interview to audio record 
the interviews. Data were kept confidentially and all 
interviews were kept anonymous.
3. Results
According to our respondents, priority setting in hospi-
tals within the public health care system two prominent 
decision-making corps influence: a committee within 
the hospital –Comité Asesor Técnico Administrativo 
(CATA)– and the DoH, a government corps overseeing 
the operation of 33 public hospitals within the capital 
district of Buenos Aires. 
This section will describe the nature of these two 
decision-making entities from participants’ perspective, 
including 1) the main players and their roles in the 
priority setting process; 2) the rationales considered; 
3) publicity; 4) revisions or appeals mechanisms; and 
5) enforcement/leadership. Verbatim quotes from par-
ticipants are included to help illustrate key points. 
The Main Players and their Roles
All study respondents consistently reported that in 
Buenos Aires all important decision making occurs at 
the DoH. Annual budgetary reviews are conducted by 
the DoH which meets with each hospital to discuss its 
needs. The budget is initially reviewed and adjusted by 
hospital management and presented to the DoH for ap-
proval. The DoH is responsible for supplies’purchasing 
and the allocation of equipment and staff. One half 
of all supplies comes from Central Purchasing –a pur-
chasing system serving all municipal public hospitals– 
managed by the DoH. Most of the hospital’s budget 
(65%-70%) is alloted to human resources. Salaries, 
hiring, promoting and transferring are managed at the 
district’s level and strongly influenced by a unionized 
environment. As one of the respondent explains:
“The Hospital does not manage Human Resources 
policy; it does not manage salaries, it does not 
manage economic incentives. Neither does it 
decide if a person should retire or stay 5 more 
years. This depends on the DoH. Conclusion: The 
management of the Hospital does not manage 
66% of the budget.  This leaves only 34%. Of 
this percentage there are providers, that is to say, 
tertiary services: kitchen, laundry, maintenance, 
cleaning, security. These tertiary services are for 
all hospitals administered from a central level…..
This leaves 20% of the budget to manage, and this 
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percentage corresponds to supplies: medication, 
disposable items, etc. A part of these supplies is 
obtained by centralized purchasing (at the DoH). 
At the central level they buy syringes and serum 
for the 33 hospitals.  They ask us the quantity of 
syringes that we need, but they decide the quality 
of the syringes they send us.  When a patient 
screams, we find out that the needle doesn’t per-
forate the skin.  This is the situation.  Conclusion: 
The Hospital management only manages 10% 
of its budget.”
CATA consists of approximately 20 persons, (including 
heads of departments, Municipal Doctors Association, 
Union Representatives, Medical Directors, and the 
hospital administrators) and is chaired by the hospital 
director. They meet weekly for deliberation among 
major stakeholders. Participation in CATA meetings 
depends on what is going to be decided hence, not all 
representatives are required to be present at all meet-
ings. Many hospital’s decisions are said to be made 
at CATA’s meetings. An informant from the DoH 
described their perception of CATA:
“CATA is composed by all the services’ heads. Its 
function is to discuss inside the hospital what 
it is going to buy and what not, which is the 
hospital’s aim , and which isn’t, on the basis of 
health policy…”
Departmental heads present their priority needs for 
supplies or equipment and additional staff to CATA, 
which presents it to the DoH. CATA also acts as a 
forum to announce decisions made by the hospital 
management. Respondents from the hospital manage-
ment described CATA as a forum for each department 
to present their needs, explaining that democracy and 
consensus are these meetings’goals. However, if that 
is not considered achievable by management, the 
Director decides by himself. Hence, CATA’s types of 
decisions  seemed unclear. 
For example, one respondent stressed that “when deci-
sions involve money we take decisions –Only us and the 
medical directors. No one else”.
Some medical staff, on the other hand, stated that 
CATA meets “when there was a very important decision.” 
However, another physician, in frustration said, “they 
meet, and they meet, but they have never solved anything 
for me.” An administrator describing CATA’s functions 
and challenges pointed out the tension felt between the 
demands of the hospital and the inability for manage-
ment to respond to them. 
CATA is “a permanent monitor of the budget, ne-
gotiation between areas (within the hospital). We 
explain to certain services that we can’t continue 
with the broken respirators: they have to be fixed. 
Or this is the year of the “grupo electrógeno”, or 
of the dentistry examining rooms, because the 
cushions don’t work anymore. In general, every-
body wants something, and the majority have 
good intentions.  Some, not so much.  But this is 
an organization, and you can’t satisfy  everybody’s 
requirements”.
Requests for human resources from the DoH do not 
pass through CATA. The director of the hospital ex-
plained “If I need nurses, I need nurses. I don’t need to 
ask anyone if I need nurses at the hospital”.
On the other hand, the staff members thought that 
participation in CATA was exclusive -- they did not 
understand how resources were distributed among 
departments within the hospital, nor did they expect 
to.  Inquiries made by researchers around this issue 
often elicited confusion or even blank responses. 
Hence, while democracy and inclusiveness may be 
desirable, decisions made by CATA are often non-
participatory. 
“It depends on the personal style of each hospital 
director… There isn’t a participatory nor negotia-
ted budget. Basically, it is up to the director of the 
hospital: the relationship is absolutely hierarchical. 
The department’s head can ask for anything, but 
it is the director who decides whether to accept or 
deny petitions”.
Since the DoH controls most of the hospital’s budget, 
its management is ill equipped to respond to local needs 
or to plan future spending priorities independently. 
The Rationales
The most frequent reasons attributed to resource 
allocation decisions at both  district and  hospital 
level included: DoH’s health policy and objectives, 
personal, economic, political, historical  and ‘arbitrary’ 
reasons.
District’s health policy and objectives1) 
The DoH controls most of the hospitals’ budgets in 
the district; several respondents indicated that resource 
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allocation followed the policies and objectives of the 
district-wide health network which are established at 
the DoH and approved by legislature. 
Personal reasons2) 
Most respondents thought that the reasons given 
at both the organizational and ministerial levels, 
depended upon personal relationships, within those 
who decided, as was indicated by an official in an 
international donor agency: 
“It depends upon the personal style of each hospital 
director… Votes don’t exist: it is a ‘clientelistic’ 
relationship between the chief of the department 
and the director of the hospital.  There aren’t norms 
for allocating resources”. 
Many participants said that arrangements were taken 
among management and departments based on per-
sonal relationships and mutual benefit.  A nurse stated 
that “(Personal relations) is how everything is managed 
in Argentina, it is what we know…” While the head of 
a leading department stated:
“I think we are too used to work in a personalized, 
interpersonal way. What we really want to do is 
to work within established structures and in a 
truly good and direct organization… we are very 
‘personalistas’. The general directors talk directly to 
the Secretary… If I have an opportunity to take 
advantage through personal relations my mana-
gement benefits.  It can’t be that way”. 
In addition, there was a feeling that departments with 
the most ambitious and persuasive departmental lead-
ers were rewarded with resources, while the needs of 
others were ignored. As indicated by a respondent who 
intimated, resources were provided to “the most insistent 
or persuasive rather than by real requirement”.
Economic reasons3) 
According to the respondents at the DoH and by 
hospital administrators, resource allocation decisions 
should be guided by economic considerations. The 
DoH administrators felt that it was their responsibility 
to keep unchecked spending under control –there was 
concern about medical professionals’ decisions who did 
not consider budgetary limitations. One of the admin-
istrators explained that they had no way of assessing the 
actual necessity of the requests made by the staff:
“(O)ne wonders if (the requests) are medical 
necessities, or if it is only the nurse, (derogatory 
local expression), who just wants me to buy non-
sense… (O)ne of the most troublesome problems 
we have is the asymmetry of information– between 
doctors and economists,  economists and providers, 
providers and doctors”. 
4)  Political reasons
Decision-making was and remains centralized. Since 
those who make decisions within the health care 
system are politically appointed, respondents thought 
that health care related decision-making, especially at 
the DOH, was determined by political and personal 
agendas and not by actual needs. These feelings were 
expressed by most of the hospital staff and health 
advocates.
5)  Historical reasons
An historical budgeting system predominated through-
out the health care system, especially at the DoH 
–budget allotments are often determined by previous 
years spending. As one medical director stated “unfor-
tunately, we do everything backwards, following events 
and facts. ‘How much did we spend last year? Add 10% 
and we keep everything as usual’”. Both hospital and 
management were critical about lack of foresight and 
planning in the budgeting process.
Arbitrary reasons6) 
Respondents felt that the absence of data led to ar-
bitrary, ad hoc or intuitive decision-making, which 
was easily manipulated. Commenting on resource al-
location at the DOH respondents said; “much of what 
is requested in the budget has no justification: it lacks 
evidence”. Within the hospital management expressed 
their frustration in not having adequate informatics: 
“Another issue is how we manage resources. They 
provide me with supplies, but how do you control 
its use. Again, there are failures in the control of 
stock. Considering the complexity of the system, 
why must we continue to manage with paper 
and pencil: other mechanisms of control have to 
be applied. The hospital should be much more 
computerized…”
Due to the absence of evidence, participants thought 
that decisions were influenced by union whims, pres-
tige and uninformed biases. For example, the allocation 
of human resources was thought to be influenced by the 
Ministerial and union ‘whims’. This turns the hospital 
ACTA 2 2009.indd   188 3/11/09   07:33:00
Acta Bioethica  2009; 15 (2)
189
unable to acquire, discipline or dismiss staff, creating 
great inefficiencies in labor: 
“(S)ince the Hospital is not descentralized, one 
cannot administer rewards and punishments… 
if I don’t want someone to work here anymore, 
the following day he consults the union, or he 
addresses a political contact that works in the 
Department of Health”. 
Furthermore, nurses and the heads of less prestigious 
departments claimed that resources were allocated to 
departments and staff that contributed to the greater 
prestige of the hospital management and to the political 
agendas of the Secretary of Health.
Practitioners felt that many decisions were based on 
uninformed biases of other actors in the decision-
making process. Many respondents were concerned 
about decisions being made by administrators who 
lacked an understanding of medical issues, such as 
severity or health repercussions, as was expressed by 
a physician:
“People that make up administrative management 
have knowledge of a need as it is written on paper, 
but they do not understand the reasoning behind 
it; they don’t understand the significance of the 
reason for that request… for example, for them a 
light bulb is worth the same as an apparatus that 
measures blood pressure and pulse”.
Publicity
Hospital administrators were told to put budgetary 
decisions publicly available, all tenders made public via 
internet and to send emails to all registered providers. 
However, no reference was made to transparency of 
decisions regarding the hospital’s interdepartmental 
resources distribution: 
“There is a lot of publicity:  We (in Argentina) do 
our purchasing ‘behind closed doors’.  If I want 
anything I call three friends, and the budget is 
ready.  Nevertheless, everything  that requires 
contracting is transparent…” 
Among the staff, there is a general understanding 
that transparency is absent within the hospital and 
health care system, to the extent that such a notion 
was often considered foreign. Only one physician had 
an objection regarding the lack of transparency.  She 
stated that: 
“(Y)ou know through internet or simply by asking, 
which is  the hospital’s budget , but you can’t ask, 
like I believe you should be able to, about the 
distribution of those resources according to each 
area (inside the hospital)”. 
Informants from the DoH were more receptive to the 
idea that publicity needs to be improved and that there 
are increasing attempts to make information available 
to the public through, for example, internet and public 
consultations. 
Revision or Appeals Mechanisms
There was a lack of clear appeal process for the staff, this 
situation left many frustrated and desperate. Informal 
appeals to decisions were taken to CATA or to the 
DoH, however  practitioners felt that only complaints 
from departments that gave prestige to the hospital 
were considered. Many practitioners felt anger when 
appeals for more nursing staff or equipment both to 
management and DoH were repeatedly ignored. The 
Chiefs of some departments felt that appeals to CATA 
were not productive. 
According to the hospital managers when their requests 
were either ignored or rejected they turned to the 
hospital foundations for equipment donations.  Do-
nations were determined by the foundation’s interests 
and the hospital’s needs. The managers considered this 
an opportunity to bypass the governing authority of 
the DoH.
Enforcement/Leadership
There were no mechanisms or leaders’ initiatives, to 
ensure that decisions were made fairly (as defined by 
‘Accountability for Reasonableness’). 
4. Discussion
This is the first time a paper provides an empirical 
description of hospital priority setting within Argen-
tina’s health system, and the first evaluation of hospital 
priority setting employing ‘Accountability for Reason-
ableness’ in Latin America. 
Overview
This study was timely in Argentina, where there is a 
growing awareness of a need for fairer decision-making 
processes. This is outlined in both ministerial (policy) 
level and within the academia since the 2001 crisis. 
For example, in 2004 the Secretary of Health pub-
lished an extensive document examining the crisis of 
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legitimacy of decision-making in the health care system 
in Argentina, acknowledging a political stranglehold 
that has failed to reflect the values of its citizens(6). 
However, our findings indicate that there are enormous 
hurdles to overcome to achieve fairer decision-making 
(as evaluated by Accountability for Reasonableness) 
within hospitals where priority setting remains highly 
centralized and politicized.
The Process
Democratic deliberation and value-based priority set-
ting is desirable in Argentina as was reflected in the 
Argentinean Minister of Health speech when proposing 
health care reforms: “…Social and political values are 
the basis of State-Society relations. They are the pillars on 
which to construct governability, consensus and the democ-
ratization of power…”(6). CATA is a clear attempt at 
achieving these procedural goals within the hospital. 
Unfortunately, our respondents felt that CATA was 
mostly powerless to address their concerns over chal-
lenges of insufficient human resources or deficient 
equipment and supplies. Neither did CATA provide 
sufficient communication to alleviate tensions and 
frustrations concerning decisions, and this discouraged 
them from participating in the priority setting process. 
Loss of interest in participating in ineffective priority 
setting has also been documented elsewhere(16, 21). 
Furthermore, the management of human resources at 
the DoH level reflected the opposite of these proce-
dural goals, frustrating respondents at all levels with 
the politicization of human resource allocation and 
the corruption and “clientelism” that governed the 
allocation of resources.
The Reasons
Many social policies in Argentina announce their com-
mitment to values such as equity and participation. The 
Minister of Health stated that “Argentines can no longer 
limit the discussion of reform of healthcare to its financial 
aspects”, and proceeded to outline the common values 
at political level that need to be reflected in decision-
making within the health care system, including Eq-
uity, Social Justice, Citizenship, Solidarity, Plurality, 
Efficiency and Quality(6). However, implementation 
of most of these values in decision making is yet to be 
realized, as revealed in our study findings.
Most of our respondents felt that decision making was 
arbitrary and not supported by relevant or defendable 
rationales. Staff and medical directors felt that senior 
management based their decisions on their personal 
relationships and not on medical realities; administra-
tors felt that practitioners failed to consider resource 
limitations when making decisions. Respondents be-
lieved that decisions made at the DoH were dictated 
by political strategies and were not responsive to the 
needs of patients. The ill informed decision-making 
process within the hospital was partly blamed on the 
weak bioinformatics infrastructure at both the institu-
tion and DoH. This finding mirrors a similar study in 
Uganda and other developing countries where weak 
infrastructure was found to be primary barrier to 
improved priority setting(16,17). 
Publicity
We found that publicity was mainly generated by the 
DOH and was limited to tenders and general budget 
decisions within the hospital.  These were not surprising 
findings in view of the current literature on governance 
in Latin America –Cunilla Grua of the Latin American 
Centre of Administration for Development (CLAD) 
discussed the necessity of transparency in public ad-
ministration in order to achieve legitimacy in Latin 
America in her article espousing the democratization of 
public administration(23), but there is an absence of a 
discussion in the policy and research literature regard-
ing the need for increased publicity of decision-making 
within Argentina’s health system, which was mirrored 
in the absence of discussion regarding the need for pub-
licity or transparency of decisions within the hospital. 
However, these findings may seem controversial since 
transparency is emphasized in Latin America, both in 
the public administration policies and in the literature, 
as a vehicle for achieving legitimacy of decisions. 
Revisions or Appeals
The concept of an appeals process was absent from 
policy and academic literature in Argentina.  An appeals 
process within the hospital was said to exist through 
CATA, however staff expressed frustration with the 
process. Informal approaches were found more effective 
- as has been described  in previous literature(16,21). 
Enforcement/Leadership
Hospital priority setting in Argentina may be improved 
by efforts to meet the conditions of fairness.  In previ-
ous studies elsewhere, priority setting leadership was 
identified as the area most in need of improvement(24). 
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Nevertheless, explicit and coordinated efforts are re-
quired by leaders at both the ministry and institutional 
level and this seems unlikely in an environment where 
political power holds firm, even through extreme eco-
nomic crisis(11). While elections may occur, the same 
political elites rotate positions, protecting dominant 
power structures.  Respondents at the Ministerial level 
appeared to be cautiously optimistic, believing that 
change was possible, but would be slow coming.
To implement a fair process modeled after A4R at 
hospital level within Buenos Aires, a minimum of 
municipal support would be necessary. The public 
hospital within the capital city is part of a municipally 
directed network of health service delivery.  Resources 
are largely controlled at city level. The introduction of 
this process at this time would be compatible with the 
state objectives of Municipal officials who have stated 
that ‘decentralization’ of decision-making regarding the 
use of resources to the hospital level is an objective of 
the current administration(11).
Improvement efforts should involve iterative, ongoing 
improvement mechanisms guided by an explicit ethical 
framework(25). A4R could serve to lift the veil of per-
sonal and political interests to determine the allocation 
of resources.  Unfortunately, hospitals may not have the 
flexibility to implement new practice and policy at the 
organizational level to enforce such a decision-making 
structure, due to the highly centralized political control 
over health care delivery.
The academia in Argentina and Latin America are 
currently bringing many of the above challenges to 
the forefront, and the discussion of how to make the 
allocation of resources fairer is slowly being brought 
front into the dialogue on public administration.  For 
example Cunill Grau in CLAD’s recent publication 
discusses the need to democratize public administration 
in an attempt to depoliticize bureaucracy and return 
it to the control of its citizens to protect it from cor-
ruption(23). Nonetheless, political realities and public 
perceptions have created enormous barriers to change. 
Historically Argentina has been grappling with corrupt 
systems of governance and weak organizations, and the 
recent economic crisis has sent to the public the message 
that nothing will change. Hence, overwhelming public 
apathy stands in partnership with a lack of political will 
as the largest roadblocks to bringing tangible reforms.
Study limitations
Our findings are limited in that they are specific to this 
institution and to our participants. The goal of this 
research was to describe and evaluate actual priority 
setting –generalizability was not a goal. However, there 
is reason to believe that the findings here are relevant to 
other Argentinean hospitals, and are probably relevant 
to priority setting in many health systems, particularly 
in Latin America. Also, linguistic barriers posed a chal-
lenge in interviewing. Nevertheless, both the Research 
Assistant (R.A) –a native of Buenos Aires– and the 
principal investigator attended almost all interviews 
together. The combined skills served to provide a 
unique and productive dynamic of information gather-
ing and interpretation and may have prompted more 
open responses from respondents. 
5. Conclusion
Fairness in priority setting is a priority for public 
administration in Argentina, however, the historical, 
political, and social context challenge the realization 
of this goal. Our study, which described and evaluated 
priority setting in a hospital, revealed that there is much 
room improvement if priority setting is to be fair. 
Within the existing policies, Argentina’s health policy 
makers should continue to pursue implementation of 
effective democratization of policy making, through 
the development of fair process at both hospital and 
ministry levels. In a fairer environment, participation, 
transparency and information needs can be highlighted 
and addressed, and cost-effectiveness can be empha-
sized alongside other context specific relevant criteria. 
‘Accountability for Reasonableness’ can help guide 
health policy makers expecting to improve fairness in 
their priority setting.
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